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Abstract: This paper deals with the location of R&D by vertical multinational firms. By taking 
the colocation of laboratories and productive plants as a benchmark, we can see that the 
spatial separation of both emerges under two conditions – high intensity of R&D spillovers and 
strong size asymmetry between countries. The latter condition is effective since it is related 
with a rising international inequality of wages. If the spatial separation of R&D and 
manufacturing takes place, headquarters services (namely R&D units) will be likely located in 
the smaller country. The converse pattern, where laboratories are place in the larger country, 
may arise if production is high-tech and the localized externalities of research activity are 
strong. Hence, this article confirms the main results of the literature on this topic but in the 
context of a different framework which allows us to tackle two usually disregarded topics: the 
transfer cost of technology; and the direct engagement of industrial workers in R&D spillovers. 
These aspects are dealt with by presupposing that, in addition to a “technological” externality 
among researchers, there is an “educational” externality exerted by researchers upon 
neighbouring industrial workers. When a country loses its laboratories, the inhabitants 
become intellectually “impoverished” and their labour starts to have a lesser efficiency. 
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The location of R&D units is a subject which is scarcely dealt with. The dominant perception in 
this field is that research laboratories tend to be collocated with productive plants, in 
particular when the productive activity is basically high-tech. 
However, multinational firms often set up high-tech production and R&D in different 
countries. Two examples of this kind of spatial separation are Sweden (which has a lot of R&D 
activity and comparatively few high-tech production) and Ireland (where the opposite relation 
holds). 
The location of R&D activities is a part of the overall spatial strategy of multinational firms. In 
particular, it is closely connected with the location of the so called vertical multinationals (as in 
HELPMAN, 1984), a situation with zero trade costs in spite of the fact that there are economies 
of scale in the productive activity. In this case, R&D activities (and other headquarters services) 
may show either of two spatial patterns. 3 
They may either collocate with the plant if trade alone equalizes the prices of productive 
factors across countries. Or they may separate spatially from manufacturing through locating 
in a different country. The latter possibility arises if the relative factor endowments of the two 
countries are so opposed that trade is per se unable to equalize the factor costs across 
countries. In this situation, the firm locates each stage (R&D, manufacturing) in the country 
which is relatively abundant in the kind of input that this stage uses more intensively. 
The forecasts of the vertical multinational firm are rather limited. All in all it amounts to say 
that R&D tends to locate in the country where human capital is available in larger quantities, 
the distribution of this input across countries being presupposed rather than explained by the 
model. Models where growth is led by the production of “blueprints” of differentiated 
consumer goods, such as MARTIN and OTTAVIANO (1999), are based on a given and fixed 
initial distribution of researchers across countries, although the manufacturing of each brand is 
not necessarily tied to the country where the product “idea” was initially conceived. 
By assuming that trade costs are positive (although not “prohibitive”), the literature on the so 
called horizontal FDI (MARKUSEN and VENABLES, 2000; MARKUSEN, 2002) provides a likely 
forecast for the location of R&D units (and other headquarters services, in general), in the 
particular case where the two countries have approximate relative factor endowments, but 
very different absolute endowments or market sizes. In this case, the productive activity is 
driven by the interplay of positive trade costs and scale economies (the so called Home Market 
effect, as in KRUGMAN, 1980) and it concentrates in the country with the larger number of 
consumers. The agglomeration of plants in in the larger market raises factor costs there and it 
“crowds out” R&D activities to the smaller country which thus becomes the home for the 
headquarters of most multinational firms. 
                                                          
3 DEFEVER (2006) remarks that, while R&D units are spatially driven towards high-tech production, the 
same kind of spatial orientation does not hold for other headquarters services. 
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Although some small countries, such as Sweden, the Netherlands and Switzerland, contain a 
disproportionately high share of multinational firm headquarters, there exist many instances 
of international corporation R&D services which are in large countries. In order to account for 
this possibility, the theory should include the positive technological externalities which each 
researcher exerts on his fellows who live and work close by (see SIEDSCHLAG et Al, 2013). 
Hence, we can check empirically that the location of an R&D unit is driven by the knowledge 
base of the region where it is to be sited, as expressed by the intensity of patents. Evidence 
also clearly shows us that the proximity to centres of excellence in research is a very important 
factor when the firm chooses where to locate its new research facility abroad. Consequently, 
R&D units are placed where they can obtain technology from local sources. 
By presupposing that R&D spillovers are strong enough, EKHOLM and HAKKALA (2007) account 
for the possibility that headquarters/labs within the multinational firm are placed in the larger 
country. Nevertheless their analysis suffers from two kinds of limitations. Firstly, there is no 
cost of technology transfer, i.e., the spatial separation of labs and factories does not entail any 
specific kind of expense. Secondly, technological externalities engage only labs thus leaving 
aside plants and the productive activity. 
In this article, we confirm the main findings of the literature on R&D activity location and we 
deal with the two mentioned limits of previous analyses. 
 
 
2. An overview of the economy 
 
We presuppose an economy with two vertically related industries. The upstream industry is 
made up by a set of laboratories. Like in ROMER (1990), each laboratory produces a piece of 
non-rival technological capital, i.e., a differentiated “design” or “blueprint” of a producing 
process. The downstream industry is composed by manufacturing firms which combine these 
differentiated “blueprints” with labor so as to produce a consumer composite good. 
As a preliminary approach, we presuppose a closed country, where N  individuals live. Within 
the set of N persons, a number X are “researchers” who work in laboratories (labs 
henceforth) and Z  are industrial workers operating in factories which produce a final 
composite good. Hence, we have 
 N X Z= +   (2.1) 
    
As it was stated before, the economy is formed by two vertically linked industries: 
1) An upstream industry is made by a set of identical labs. Each lab uses a physical unit of 
labor (an individual who is a “researcher”) as a private input. However, following here 
the endogenous growth literature (FRANKEL, 1962; ROMER, 1986, 1990), the labor 
productivity of each “researcher” is determined, as a collective input, by the number X  
of labs/researchers which operate in the economy. This collective input is a source of 
externalities at two different levels: 
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• At the generation of “blueprints” of producing methods, i. e., at the production 
of the technological capital itself as expressed by K . 
• As a local educative externality, similar to those present in LUCAS (1988) and 
BENABOU (1993). The proportion of researchers in total population enhances 
the average amount of human capital possessed by each individual working in 
the economy, including both researchers in labs and workers in factories. 
Hence, if we presuppose that the physical unit of labor is the unit (one employed 
person), the amount of labor in efficiency units that each individual supplies to 
production is labeled as 1l ≥ . 
We may summarize the description above by saying that the production function of a 
lab is given by, 
 K Xl=   (2.2) 
    
From (2.2), we see that the output of a lab is positively influenced by the collective 
input of research work in the overall economy and by the labor efficiency of the 
researcher who works for that lab. 
In turn, the labor efficiency of workers (both researchers and industrial workers) is an 
increasing function of the proportion of researchers in the country’s labor force. Not 
only a researcher produces technological knowledge, but in addition he disseminates 
knowledge in the labor force, thus increasing the labor productivity in the overall 
economy. We model this educational externality as, 






= + + 
 
  (2.3) 
   
In (2.3), as it will be seen ahead, α  stands for the elasticity of technological capital in 
the overall production function, or, what is equivalent, it represents the share of this 





The degree of knowledge and skills of agents varies directly with the proportion of 
researchers in total population and with the relative importance, α , of technological 
capital as an input to production of the consumer composite good. 
 
2) A manufacturing firm which combines technological capital (a “blueprint” of a 
productive process) with labor in order to produce a consumer composite good. 
Since both upstream labs and downstream manufacturing firms form perfectly 
competitive firms, we may assume that the prices of both a “blueprint” and the final 
composite good are given to the individual firms and equal to 1 without loss of 
generality. 
Consequently, this economy may also be regarded as being made by competitive, 
vertically integrated firms. Each vertically integrated firm uses one researcher and z  




αα −=   (2.4) 
   
Or, by substituting (2.2) in (2.4), we have 
 ( ) ( )
( )1
y Xl z l
α α−
=   (2.5) 
   
where y  stands for the output of composite good generated by a vertically integrated 




Parameter ( )0,1α ∈  has a triple economic meaning: 
1. According to (2.4), it gives the technological intensity of the industry. A high α  
expresses the fact that the industry is a high-tech one. 
2. Bearing in mind that, (2.5) can be written as 
 
( )1
y X z l
αα −=   (2.6) 
α  can be seen to express the intensity of spillovers across researchers or labs. 
3. By taking function (2.3) in Figure 1 into consideration, α  can be regarded as bounding 
from above the positive external influence that research activities in a country exert 
upon the efficiency of their workers, thus upon the overall educational level in that 
country. 
We begin to determine the profit-maximizing number of workers hired by the representative 
firm, thus determining its size. 
We assume that the vertically integrated competitive firms behave as a “large group” of 
symmetric agents (as in CHAMBERLIN, 1948), where each one presupposes that, when it varies 
the amount of labor engaged, the other firms keep their volumes of industrial employment 
unchanged. Consequently, each firm takes as given the total number Z  of industrial workers 







= + + 
 
, the efficiency of each agent (either worker or researcher) in the 
economy.  
Like in ROMER (1990), technological capital works as joint, non-rival input to many industrial 
firms. Consequently, each vertically integrated firm faces the expenditure with the 
technological capital that it uses as a fixed cost, F , so that the aggregate profit function of the 
consumer good industry becomes from (2.5) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
( )1
z Xl zl wz F
α α
π
− = − −
 
  (2.7) 
   
The representative firm maximizes its profit in relation to the amount of labor used, z . An 
interior maximum is reached by solving the first order condition, as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 0z Xl z l w
α α α
π α
− −′ = − − =   (2.8) 
   
Or, solving for the wage 




The profit maximizing level of hired labor fulfills the condition (2.8) that in a competitive 
industry the wage should equal the value of the marginal product of labor.4 
Substituting ŵ  from (2.9) into the profit function (2.7) and equating this function to zero, 
since the vertically integrated firm is perfectly competitive, we obtain the condition, 
 




1 0XL zl X z l z F
α α α απ α
− −   = − − − =  
  (2.10) 
   




F X z l
ααα
−
=%   (2.11) 
 
We presuppose now that the set of individuals in the economy play a symmetric static game, 
where each person decides to become either a “researcher” or an “industrial worker”, taking 
as given the aggregate numbers of  “industrial workers” and “researchers”,  and Z X N Z= −  
, respectively, in the economy. 
A symmetric game usually has a symmetric Nash equilibrium, which is defined as an 
equilibrium where each player uses the same strategy (either pure or mixed). Henceforth, 
following the steps of CHAMBERLIN (1948), we will concentrate on symmetric equilibria only. 
In this case, if all participants select the same pure strategy, each one choosing to become 
either an “industrial” worker or a “researcher”, a Nash equilibrium does not exist, since the 
production of the final good entails the combination of both stages, R&D and manufacturing, 
within the same vertically integrated firm. 
Clearly, the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of this large group game is the one where each 
player selects a completely mixed strategy, which, for given aggregate values of industrial 
workers and researchers, implies that both pure strategies give the same payoff. The following 
condition must be satisfied for a symmetric Nash equilibrium to exist. 
            
 ˆF w=%   (2.12) 
   
Plugging (2.9) and (2.11) into (2.12) and solving for the number of industrial workers in each 








=%   (2.13) 
                                                          




The equilibrium value of z  decreases with the degree of the technological intensity of the 






3. The case of two asymmetrically sized countries 
 
 
We now presuppose an economy made by two asymmetric countries, namely North, with 
population N   and South, with *N  consumers/workers. North is the larger country so that 
the inequality 
*
N N>  always holds. Henceforth, it will be assumed that the asterisk * labels 
magnitudes concerned with the smaller country South. 
Labor is immobile across countries, but the technological capital produced in a country may be 
used by a plant in the other country in the context of a vertical multinational firm.  
We can prove the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: If, in both countries, all firms are “national”, in the sense that each firm employs 
locally a researcher and a set of z industrial workers, then the rewards of both technological 
capital and labor will be higher in the larger country North.  
Proof: Indeed, from (2.11), the ratio between equilibrium values of the reward of technological 
capital F%  in North  and South is 
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  (3.1) 
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− =   (3.2) 
whose solution is 
 X Nα=   (3.3) 
Similarly, for South, we have 
 
* *




   
Moreover, from (2.3) and Figure 1, we have that 
 
* 1l l α= = +   (3.5) 











  (3.6) 
   
From (2.9), the ratio of equilibrium wages in North and South can be written as 
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  (3.7) 
Applying the same reasoning as before, we can conclude that, when all firms are national, 












  (3.8) 
QED 
Similar in some way to models with positive transport costs and production under increasing 
returns (such as MARKUSEN and VENABLES, 1998 and 2000), where a Home Market arises in 
the location of productive units (as in KRUGMAN, 1980), factor prices also rise here in the 
larger country. However, as now the economy is perfectly competitive and it works under zero 
trade costs, the rise in factor prices in the northern country is exclusively due to externalities in 
R&D which are enhanced by country population size. 





3.1. Equilibrium spatial distribution of production 
 
We now deal with the location of the productive activities in this economy. As it was seen 
before, these are R&D and the manufacturing of a final consumer good across the two 
asymmetric countries. 
As before, since the location decisions are taken simultaneously by a large group of symmetric 
firms, we will restrict our analysis to two symmetric Nash equilibria, namely 
• The pattern where all firms are “national”, research and manufacturing being 
performed in the same proportion within each country. We will name this pattern as 
the “national pattern”. 
• The pattern where all firms are “multinational” and country specialization is complete. 
All firms perform research in a country and combine the technological capital thus 
created with labor to manufacture a final consumer good in the other country.5 
 
In what follows, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions so that each type of 
locational symmetric Nash equilibrium holds. 
 
3.2. Equilibrium without country specialization: the “national pattern” 
 
We consider now situations where each firm is “national”, in the sense that it performs both 
research and manufacturing in a single country. We have seen before that the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium of a large group of individuals entails the adoption of a completely mixed strategy 
whose support is the set of pure strategies (to become an industrial worker, to become a 
researcher). Given the aggregate numbers of both professions,  and Z X N Z= − , the 
completely mixed equilibrium strategy is defined by the indifference condition (2.13), which 






= =   (3.9) 














α ∈ ∈  stand for the 
share of technological capital in total production costs and the coefficient of symmetry in size 
between countries South and North. Two remarks on this type of symmetric Nash equilibrium 
are suitable to say now. 
Firstly, conditions (3.9) hold in any point of the above mentioned parameter space. Hence, a 
situation where production is undertaken by national, single plant firms is always feasible.  
Secondly, since this Nash equilibrium entails a completely mixed strategy for each player it is 
non-strict, in the sense that each player has two pure best replies to any aggregate numbers  
                                                          
5 The assumption of complete country specialization will be introduced here for the sake of simplicity. 
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of “workers” and “researchers”. Consequently, an arbitrarily small shift of parameter α  can 
shift the economy to an out of equilibrium situation (see among others WEIBULL, 1997, p. 15). 










. Where it is the unique Nash equilibrium, it will be taken as the 
solution of the game. Otherwise, whenever another strict Nash equilibrium, possibly involving 
a multinational organization of production, is present, the latter will be selected as the 
outcome of the game.  
 
3.3. Equilibrium with full country specialization: the “multinational” pattern 
 
We assume now that a symmetric arrangement holds where all firms are vertical 
multinationals. Hence, they perform research in a single country and use the technological 
capital thereby generated in order to manufacture a consumer good employing the individuals 
living in the other country. For simplicity, we presuppose that country specialization is full. A 
country only does R&D while only manufacturing takes place in the other country. 
 
3.3.1. Multinationals have headquarters in the larger country 
 
We start with the assumptions that all firms do research in the North, manufacturing being 
performed exclusively by industrial workers in South. Only laboratories locate in the North 
whose inhabitants are all researchers. 
This pattern is an equilibrium if and only if the following two conditions are both satisfied: 
• No researcher in the North finds profitable to become an industrial worker, i.e. 
 ˆ
m mF w≥
%   (3.10) 
where the subscript m  indicates that we are dealing with a situation where firms are 
multinationals. 
• No industrial worker in the South has an incentive to become a researcher. This is 




%   (3.11) 




Proposition 2: The condition 
* *ˆ
m mF w≤
%  in (3.11) is trivially fulfilled. 
Proof: The complete specialization of each country in a stage (North in R&D, South in 
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= + + = + = 
 
  (3.12) 
According to (2.9), the equilibrium wage paid by the multinational firm headed in North to the 
industrial workers in South, in the right hand side of inequality (3.10) is 
 




= −   (3.13) 
 
It follows from (3.12) that the wage 
*ˆ
mw  in (3.13)simplifies to 
 
 




= + −   (3.14) 
 
If an industrial worker in South switches to become a researcher, then he would set up a 
single-plant “national” plant. Consequently, his reward, 
*
mF
% ,  could be expressed as the 
difference between the total revenues of a “national” firm located in South and total industrial 
labor costs at the wage rate which is paid in South by multinational firm subsidiaries, i.e. 
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m m
F X l z l z w
α α− = −
  
%   (3.15) 
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  (3.16) 
   
By inserting (3.16) and (3.14) into (3.15), the researcher’s reward in South can be simplified as 
 
( )
( ) ( )
1
*








   = − + −    
%   (3.17) 
Taking into account (3.14) and (3.17), inequality 
* *ˆ
m mF w≤
%  becomes 
 
( )









α αα αα α α α α
−
−   − + − ≤ + −    
  (3.18) 
It is direct to show that inequality (3.18) simplifies as  
 ( ) ( ) ( )
*
1  where 1 1
N
K K K N
N
αα α α− ≤ ≡ + −   (3.19) 
It is clear that inequality is fulfilled for any values of 
*,  and N N α , because the values of 
 and K N  can be set  to any desired value through the choice of adequate  of units of measure 






































  (3.21) 









Hence, the organization of industrial production within a vertical multinational where all 
researchers live in the large country North and all manufacturing workers have residences in 




%   
 
The reward paid by the multinational to its researcher in North is the difference between total 
revenues and total expenditure in wages paid to the workers living in South, i.e. 




* * * *ˆ
m m
F Xl z l z w
αα − = −
  
%   (3.22) 
 
By plugging terms from (3.12) and (3.14) into (3.22), the fixed cost of technological capital for 
the multinational can be simplified as 




= +%   (3.23) 
    
By substituting  (3.14) and (3.23) in (3.10), the condition of non-deviation by a researcher in 








≥   (3.24) 















α >   (3.25) 
   
This means that multinationals with headquarters in North can arise only if technological 
capital is important to raw labor as an input to the production of consumer goods, i.e., if the 





3.3.2. Multinationals have headquarters in the smaller country 
 
Since the two countries are symmetric in all aspects but in what concerns population size, the 
equilibrium condition of a pattern where firms are multinationals with headquarters in South, 
can be obtained from (3.24) by interchanging parameters













  (3.26) 
We can also easily seen that the equivalent of Proposition 2 for South-based multinationals 
always holds. Let us assume that a multinational with headquarters in the smaller country pays 
wage ˆ
m
w  to its workers in the plant located in North. If one of this workers unilaterally 
becomes a researcher, then he would get 
mF
%  as reward for his research output. By symmetry 
with Proposition 2, we are able to write inequality ˆ
m mF w≤
% , whose two sides can be easily 
written by interchanging parameters 
* and N N  in (3.14) and (3.17). 
We should remember that a non-strict Nash equilibrium with only national firms exists for any 









 parameter space the conditions (3.24) 
and (3.26) that bound the regions where both types of multinational firms (either based in 





4. Vertical multinational firms in the context of size asymmetry 













 . Since multiple equilibria do emerge in some regions, we should provide some 
qualifications on equilibrium selection. 
As it was said clearly before, the equilibrium with “national firms only” is a non-strict Nash 
equilibrium where each player uses the same completely mixed strategy with support in the 
two pure strategies “to become a researcher” and “to become an industrial worker”. By 
contrast, the Nash equilibria where only multinational firms exist, either based in North or in 
South, are strict Nash equilibria, since now each player adopts the same pure strategy within 
each country. Consequently, we will consider that an equilibrium with “national firms only”, 
holds in the situation where it is the unique Nash equilibrium (that is to say, in region I in 
Figure 1) and in no other one. 
Having settled this aspect, it remains to select one kind of multinational firm (either North or 





Proposition 3: The comparison of factor rewards by multinational firms with headquarters in 
different countries leads to the following results: 
a) The northern based multinational pays higher wages to its manufacturing workers 
than the southern based one because it provides relatively more technological capital 
to its manufacturing plants.  
b) When both types of multinational firms are feasible, the reward of technological 
capital by the southern based multinational will be higher (lower) than the one 
prevailing under the northern based counterpart if and only if 
1 2
2 3
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By interchanging parameters 
* and N N , the wage paid by a southern based multinational to 
its workers with residence in North is 
 




= + −   















  (4.1) 
b) The reward of technological capital by a multinational based in North is, from (3.23) 
 




= +%   
By symmetry, the reward of technological capital by a southern based multinational is 




= +%   
Taking the ratio of the two rewards and further simplifying, we obtain, 
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  (4.3) 
QED. 
Bearing in mind the conditions of Nash equilibrium selection, several comments on Figure 1 
are in order. 
Firstly, vertical multinational firms – irrespective of where they are headquartered - tend to 
arise for a moderate to high α  value. The spatial separation of R&D units and productive 
plants is more likely to emerge in high-tech industries and whenever localized spillovers are 
important. This is the case of industries pharmaceuticals and telecommunications where this 
kind of spatial separation happens more usually. 
Secondly, vertical multinationals and the split of R&D and manufacturing tend to emerge if the 
two countries are very asymmetric in size. This happens because size asymmetry enhances the 
inequality of factor prices across countries (see above Proposition 1), the larger country 
exhibiting higher prices for both technological capital and labor. As in HELPMAN (1984) and 
MARKUSEN and VENABLES (2000), this creates an incentive for separating R&D and 
manufacturing across countries. 
Thirdly, the model shows a strong bias for the empirical fact that many multinationals set up 
headquarters and research labs in small countries. In this article, multinationals tend to locate 
headquarters in the smaller country if the asymmetry between South and North is high and if 
the relative importance of technology in production is medium sized. The latter condition is 
intuitive. If α  is very low, there is no incentive to split headquarters and manufacturing plant 
and the firm works as a “national” firm. If α  is very high, the sheer importance of R&D in 
overall production leads the firm to specialize the population of the larger country North in its 
performance.     
The former condition is still more interesting since it confirms the literature on multinational 
firm location. As MARKUSEN and VENABLES say:  
This may help us to understand the importance of smaller countries such as 
Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands as home countries for 
multinationals. Essentially, production is drawn into the larger country, 
leaving the smaller country with a comparative advantage in headquarter 
service production. (MARKUSEN and VENABLES, 2000: 228) 
Although there is no Home Market effect in this paper, since trade costs on the final output are 
zero and the economy operates under perfect competition, R&D tends to concentrate in the 




The opposing case where R&D concentrates in the larger country drives here from the same 
determinants as in EKHOLM and HAKKALA (2007), namely from a high value for parameter α . 
If production is very high-tech and spillovers across labs are crucial, then for the firms it pays 
off to collaborate with a large R&D sector. This can be achieved by specializing the inhabitants 
of North in R&D. 
Our analysis integrates two aspects which were formally ignored beforehand and whose 
inclusion makes the approach more realistic. Departing from a situation where R&D and 
production take place in both countries in “national firms”, the formation of multinational 
firms leads to a negative “educational” externality in the country which specializes in 
manufacturing. The fact that this country loses the labs which used to operate aside plants 
causes an “educational impoverishment” which shows itself in a fall of labor efficiency of 
workers.  
By adding this “educational” externality we are able to tackle two different aspects of the 
analysis which were previously ignored. The spatial separation of R&D and plant brings about a 
cost in labor efficiency which is borne by the country which loses its research capacity. 
Furthermore, R&D spillovers are not confined to researchers but they also engage plants and 
industrial workers. 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
By taking the colocation of R&D units and plants within national firms as the benchmark, we 
were able to see that a spatial separation by multinationals arises under two conditions. 
Firstly, the intensity of production in R&D and its geographically localized spillovers should be 
high enough to make a country specialization in laboratory activity profitable. Secondly, the 
two countries should be sufficiently asymmetric in size so that an international difference in 
factor costs emerges, thereby creating an incentive to separate activities in space and assign 
each stage to the country where the most used input is available in relatively larger quantity. 
It is likely that the newly formed vertical multinational firms will place R&D units (alongside 
with other headquarters services) in the smaller country, where factor costs are lower. The 
opposite location strategy, labs being located in the larger country, will more likely prevail if 
the production is very intensive in R&D and the technological externalities brought about by 
researchers in their neighborhood are high enough.  
This analysis takes in consideration two aspects which were previously neglected. The spatial 
separation of labs and factories yields a positive technology transfer cost. Moreover, R&D 
spillovers do not engage only researchers but also affect the productive activity. Both aspects 
are tackled in this article by presupposing that when a country loses its R&D units by 
specializing in manufacturing, the average efficiency of its labor force is diminished in the 
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